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Abstract 
Small and medium-sized businesses as well as individuals are increasingly using online 
crowdfunding platforms to raise funds in the fintech world. Creators of crowdfunding projects 
depend heavily on social networks like Facebook to publicize their projects. Social media activities 
such as “liking” on Facebook bring massive traffic to crowdfunding projects and attract 
contributions. Using data collected from Facebook and Kickstarter, our empirical tests demonstrate 
that social media activities significantly and positively impact the likely success of crowdfunding. 
Our duration model analysis reveals that the impact of social media activities on crowdfunding 
outcomes follows a J-curve in the temporal space. We explain the J-curve by identifying two 
important effects of social media activities throughout the crowdfunding process: a quality-signaling 
effect in the opening period and a herding effect in the closing period. Especially in the “last mile,” 
there is a strong herding effect that helps crowdfunding projects reach their respective fundraising 
goals. Our results offer useful contributions to the literature and suggestions for practitioners. 
Keywords: Herding Effect, Quality-Signaling Effect, Social Media Activities, Temporal Effects, 
Crowdfunding, Facebook Like 
Prof. Choon-Ling Sia was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on October 10, 2017 and 
underwent three revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Built upon the simple idea of the wisdom of the crowd 
(Surowiecki, 2005), crowdfunding is an extension of the 
more general domain of crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006). 
Crowdfunding (i.e., internet financing), defined as “the 
financing of a project or a venture by a group of 
individuals instead of professional parties” 
(Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012), has become 
increasingly popular in the wake of the trending fintech 
phenomenon (Menat, 2016). Online crowdfunding 




sized businesses, startups, and even individuals to raise 
funds from the general public. Ranked as one of the top 
fintech companies by the New York Times,1 Kickstarter 
has hosted an average of over 30,000 projects annually 
in recent years, with a project success rate ranging from 
30% to 40%. Given the numerous online crowdfunding 
platforms available and large numbers of on-going 
projects competing for limited resources, it is essential 
that project creators understand how to successfully 
fund a project. One critical factor is driving more traffic 
to the project page. 
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According to a web analytics service provider, about 
two-thirds of the online traffic to Kickstarter is indirect 
traffic.2 The majority of Kickstarter visitors are driven 
by referrals and social networks, and Facebook 
accounts for the biggest portion of the traffic. The 
impact of Facebook has been observed in many 
successful projects. For example, in 2012, after Pebble 
Watch, which designs waterproof watches that allow 
users to communicate with mobile devices, was unable 
to raise sufficient initial funds through venture capital 
(Kosner, 2012), the company listed the project on 
Kickstarter on April 11, 2012, with a fundraising goal 
of $100,000 and a fundraising duration of 37 days.3 
The project idea immediately attracted high levels of 
attention from social networks, as Facebook users 
“liked” and “shared” the project page with their 
friends. The project was successfully funded within 
two hours of its listing. As word about the project 
continued to spread, the Pebble Watch project 
eventually raised more than US$10 million from over 
68,000 funders in 37 days. By the end of the 
fundraising period, the project had generated over 
100,000 online “discussions” on Facebook, including 
over 30,000 Facebook “likes,” more than 40,000 
“comments,” and over 30,000 “shares.” 
Naylor, Lamberton, and West (2012) label Facebook 
“like” features and similar social buttons as “mere 
virtual presence,” which offers a convenient and 
straightforward way for people to express their 
preferences and exchange information within their 
social network circles. Users are driven to participate 
in social activities mainly through social motivation, 
that is, to establish and maintain social interaction with 
others (Salehan, Kim, & Kim, 2017). As a result, large 
numbers of conversations and word-of-mouth 
promotions have been generated online. In fact, it has 
been reported that more than six billion “likes” were 
clicked each day in December 2013 (Martin, 2014). 
Successful stories such as the Pebble Watch project 
exemplify social media’s power to positively impact 
crowdfunding projects. Anecdotal evidence generally 
seems to suggest the desirability of having more 
“likes” on a company’s social media fan page, 
prompting a vibrant new business of trading “likes,” as 
reported by NPR (Henn & Chace, 2012) and 
Huffington Post (Corlon, 2014). Some examples of 
“like” sellers are boostlikes.com, sociobooster.com, 
getyourlikes.co.uk, and ozsocial.com.au. On 
boostlikes.com, 2,000 “likes” can be purchased for 
US$143, 10,000 “likes” cost US$462 (as of June 
2018), and the cost of one “like” is in the range of a 
few cents. However, marketers also argue that the 
“like” button does not generate much value for several 
reasons. For instance, (1) “likes” may be paid for (i.e., 
generated by computer programs), which is associated 
 
2 https://www.similarweb.com/website/kickstarter.com 
with only a very short-term positive effect (Wessel, 
Thies, & Benlian, 2016); (2) the volume of “likes” may 
be so large that it trivializes the responses themselves; 
and (3) individuals may click “like” out of courtesy or 
habit and doing so may not reflect their true 
preferences. These possibilities, then, invoke the 
following questions: Do “likes” and other similar 
social media activities actually exert an influence on 
crowdfunding projects? If so, how do they dynamically 
influence the projects as they progress?  
Using data collected from Facebook and Kickstarter, 
we empirically tested the impact of social media 
activities on crowdfunding outcomes. Our results 
reveal that social media activities do have a positive 
impact on crowdfunding outcomes. More importantly, 
we show that the impact of social media activities 
exhibits a nonlinear J-curve pattern in the temporal 
space. The impact is most notable in the opening 
period of crowdfunding, resulting from a quality-
signaling effect, and in the closing period, because of 
a herding effect. Especially in the “last mile,” social 
media activities stimulate a persistent acceleration that 
helps the crowdfunding projects reach their respective 
fundraising goals.  
This paper has both practical and theoretical 
implications. The J-curve suggests that project creators 
should adopt different strategies in different 
crowdfunding periods. Specifically, in the opening 
period of crowdfunding, project creators should recruit 
friends and family, incentivize early initiators, and 
create fan pages to direct more social media traffic to 
the project page. In the intermediate period, project 
creators should make greater efforts to collect 
feedback from users, enhance project design, and 
update the existing funders with the latest project 
updates. In the final period, project creators should 
consider paid “likes” as a means of taking advantage 
of the strong impact of social media activities.  
For platform developers, this study has implications on 
the design factors of crowdfunding platforms such as 
the placement of social buttons. For the academic 
community, our work furthers the understanding of the 
herd behavior in the online crowdfunding market. Our 
findings also identify the cross-sectional variations 
among different categories of crowdfunding projects, 
as well as the time-varying hazard ratios present during 
different periods of crowdfunding. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to study the temporal 
effects of social media activities on reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms. In sum, the findings of this 
paper contribute to a growing body of literature on herd 
behavior and crowdfunding. Our results also shed light 
on the applications of crowdfunding and plausibly 
contribute to additional fields such as experimental 
3 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-
e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android 
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design, behavioral analysis, incentive mechanisms, 
and social marketing. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
We review relevant crowdfunding literature in Section 
2. In Section 3, we lay out the theoretical background 
for this study and we describe our data collection and 
data summary in Section 4. We then present our 
empirical results in Section 5 and conclude with a 
discussion in Section 6. 
2 Literature Review 
There are four prevalent types of online crowdfunding 
platforms currently active in the market: equity-based 
crowdfunding (investors gain dividends, e.g., 
CircleUp, AngelList); donation-based crowdfunding 
(donors make benevolent contributions, e.g., 
JustGiving, GiveForward); lending-based 
crowdfunding (lenders earn bonuses or interests, e.g., 
Prosper, Kiva); and reward-based crowdfunding 
(funders receive rewards from creators, e.g., 
Kickstarter, RocketHub). Of these platforms, 
researchers have increasingly focused on lending-
based and reward-based types. Extant literature on 
lending-based crowdfunding platforms investigates 
various related issues, such as observed herd behavior 
among lenders (Herzenstein, Dholakia, & Andrews, 
2011; Zhang & Liu, 2012), significant racial 
discrimination toward borrowers (Pope & Sydnor, 
2011), the effectiveness of the different market 
mechanisms of auction versus posted price (Wei & 
Lin, 2016), investors’ home bias in terms of 
geographical proximity between lenders and 
borrowers (Lin & Viswanathan, 2016), and friendship 
networks that impact the probability of successful 
funding (Lin, Prabhala, & Viswanathan, 2013). As the 
context of our paper is Kickstarter, a reward-based 
crowdfunding platform, we focus our literature review 
on the reward-based crowdfunding stream. We 
summarize relevant studies on reward-based 
crowdfunding and highlight the position of this paper 
in relation to the extant literature in Table 1. 
The majority of recent studies on reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms examine factors that 
contribute to the success of crowdfunding projects. 
These factors can be generally classified into two main 
categories: project characteristics and creator attributes 
(Mollick, 2014; Zvilichovsky, Inbar, & Barzilay, 
2015). Project characteristics include project-intrinsic 
features such as the fundraising goal and duration, 
specific rewards offered to funders should projects be 
successfully funded, and the availability of a project’s 
website. Creator attributes describe the traits 
associated with the project creator, such as 
trustworthiness, experience, and the number of friends 
of the creator. Other factors include the performance of 
past projects (Greenberg et al., 2013), phrases used to 
describe the projects (Mitra & Gilbert, 2014), and the 
location of the fundraising city (Kim & Hann, 2013). 
In their pioneering study, Zvilichovsky et al. (2015) 
found that if a project creator has backed other 
projects, then that history has a positive influence on 
funding success; however, the number of projects 
previously backed by a project creator has no effect. 
Koch and Siering (2015) similarly determined that the 
experience of the project creator, measured by the 
number of previously created projects on the same 
platform, has no significant influence on funding 
success. Also, Koch and Siering (2015) indicate that 
more comprehensive project information, presented in 
the form of texts, images, or videos, positively 
influences funding success. 












Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013 √   Google Search  
Mollick, 2014 √ √    
Zheng et al., 2014 √ √    
Zvilichovsky et al., 2015 √ √    
Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2016 √  √   
Yuan, Lau, & Xu, 2016 √     
Xiao & Yue, 2018 √  √   
Hong, Hu, & Burtch, 2018 √   Twitter  
This Paper √ √  Facebook √ 
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Another stream of reward-based crowdfunding 
literature examines funding success from the 
perspective of project funders, as opposed to project 
creators. Looking at the dynamics of funders of 
crowdfunding projects, Kuppuswamy and Bayus 
(2018) discovered that funders who use the Kickstarter 
platform are more likely to contribute to a project in 
the first and last week of the funding period rather than 
in the middle period. Furthermore, they found that this 
U-shaped pattern of project funding applies to all 
crowdfunding projects, irrespective of the success or 
failure of the funding and the size of projects. Agrawal, 
Catalini, and Goldfarb (2015) offer a different 
explanation, which suggests that early investment may 
be largely from local funders (e.g., friends & family), 
who are less responsive to information about the 
cumulative funds, while later investment is more likely 
from distant funders (e.g., total strangers from different 
regions) actively searching for and reacting to 
information about the prior funding levels. They 
discovered interesting patterns regarding who invests 
at what time throughout the crowdfunding cycle. Li 
and Duan (2014) developed an analytical model to 
explain project funders’ decisions, based on a project’s 
current status and temporal progress. The estimation of 
their model reveals both a positive network 
externalities effect, in which funders are more likely to 
support a project that has reached a milestone of the 
funding goal, as well as a negative time effect, where 
the propensity of funders to support a project declines 
over time for the same amount of achieved funding. In 
contrast, Burtch et al. (2013) found evidence 
supporting a substitution effect, which suggests that 
prior contributions may crowd out subsequent 
contributions. 
Recent studies have also begun to examine how social 
media activities, such as Google Search trends (Burtch 
et al., 2013) and Twitter activities (Hong et al., 2018), 
impact crowdfunding outcomes. Our work expands the 
research stream of the influence of social media 
activities by examining the impact of social media 
activities on Facebook. Compared to other social 
media platforms, Facebook has the largest user base, 
and, more importantly, it focuses on connecting people 
that a user already knows, such as friends, family, 
colleagues, and classmates. Facebook’s close network 
creates strong ties and facilitates more personal 
communication, making it ideal for studying the 
impact of social media activities. More importantly, as 
crowdfunding is a dynamic process that typically lasts 




solely on crowdfunding outcomes does not tell the full 
story of reward-based crowdfunding platforms. There 
is a theoretical and practical need to discern the 
dynamics of the impact of social media activities 
throughout the entire crowdfunding process. Our study 
makes unique contributions to the understanding of 
reward-based crowdfunding by examining the 
temporal effects of social media activities across 
different crowdfunding periods. 
3 Kickstarter and Theoretical 
Background 
The Kickstarter platform acts as an intermediary 
between project creators and potential funders in the 
fundraising process. The platform profits from 
drawing a commission from successful projects. Its 
core business is to assist with fundraising, rather than 
with the completion or operation of the project. 
According to Kickstarter, the platform does not 
guarantee projects or investigate a creator’s ability to 
complete their project. It is solely the funders’ 
responsibility to identify the validity and 
trustworthiness of the creator/project, and Kickstarter 
scams have been reported (Knibbs, 2015). The 
platform adopts an “all-or-nothing” model: the project 
creators only receive funds if the project is successfully 
funded on or before the deadline, otherwise no money 
exchanges hands.4 The creators of successfully funded 
projects receive all funds (minus fees) soon after their 
projects end. To start a crowdfunding project on 
Kickstarter, a project creator needs to configure a 
fundraising goal, which is the total monetary amount 
desired, and a fundraising duration, which is the total 
time length of the fundraiser. In addition, the project 
must fit into one of Kickstarter’s 13 preset categories, 
which include design, art, games, film and video, 
technology, publishing, and so forth. Although 
creators cannot offer equity or financial incentives to 
funders, they are advised to reward funders for their 
support and generosity as a way to incentivize potential 
funders. In general, a number of pledge levels are 
devised. Each level represents a different monetary 
contribution and corresponding reward. A higher 
pledge level requires a more generous contribution but, 
assuming project success, also a higher return. If a 
project fails to reach its fundraising goal, then funders 
will not be charged; if a project is fully funded before 
the fundraising closes, then the project will continue to 
be listed until the deadline. 
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Note: the user information in the figure is masked for privacy reasons. 
Figure 1. Kickstarter and Facebook 
On each project page, Kickstarter offers multiple ways 
a user can share and spread the word about the project 
(see in Figure 1). The most widely used option is the 
Facebook share button. Upon clicking the button, a 
pop-up window appears, inviting the user to share the 
project on his or her own Facebook timeline. Once the 
post is shared on Facebook, it goes public (unless the 
user sets the privacy setting to private) on the user’s 
timeline and is visible as a notification stating: “Your 
friend has shared a post” on the newsfeed of the user’s 
friends. Thus, potential funders can observe, in real 
time, other people’s activities (e.g., “likes,” 
“comments,” “shares”) related to the crowdfunding 
project. Consequently, they may decide to contribute 
to the project, subsequently publicizing their approval 
of the project on Facebook and potentially attracting 
even more funders to the projects. It creates a cascade 
of information that passes from early funders to future 
funders, helping projects reach their fundraising goals. 
Clearly, more Facebook activities bring more traffic to 
crowdfunding projects and positively impact their 
likelihood of success. The positive impact of Facebook 
activities has also been explored in contexts such as 
social commerce (Lee, Lee, & Oh, 2015), web traffic 
(Rishika et al., 2013), branding (Hoffman & Fodor, 
2010; Trattner & Kappe, 2013), and box office sales 
(Ding et al., 2017). We therefore develop two 
hypotheses to test the overall impact of Facebook 
activities in connection with crowdfunding outcomes.  
H1a: The higher the number of daily Facebook 
activities, the higher the success likelihood of 
crowdfunding projects. 
H1b: Regardless of whether the crowdfunding projects 
are successful or not, the higher the number of 
daily Facebook activities, the higher the 
percentage of pledged funds. 
In different crowdfunding periods, the impact of 
Facebook activities has different implications on 
crowdfunding outcomes. We further analyze the 
temporal effects of Facebook activities. In the opening 
period of crowdfunding, potential funders form their 
prior beliefs about a project primarily based on 
information posted on the project page (e.g., brief 
description, video demonstration), which is limited in 
terms of volume and credibility. Because of 
information asymmetry, potential funders do not know 
the true quality of the projects. However, potential 
funders are likely to instinctively infer quality based on 
others’ opinions and preferences and may update their 
beliefs about the project quality accordingly. 
Therefore, observing more Facebook activities during 
the opening period of crowdfunding should help 
potential funders reduce their uncertainty regarding 
quality and incentivize them to make contributions, 
resulting in a quality-signaling effect. Similar 
phenomena have been explored regarding products and 
services with great quality uncertainty, i.e., group 
buying (Li & Wu 2018), video-on-demand (Nam, 
Manchanda, & Chintagunta, 2010), and wedding 
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services (Tucker & Zhang 2011). We thus hypothesize 
that the impact of Facebook activities on crowdfunding 
outcomes in the opening period is strong because of the 
quality-signaling effect. 
By the closing period of crowdfunding, more project 
updates have been posted and more details (such as 
reviews) are available on the project page, which should 
significantly reduce potential funders’ uncertainty 
regarding quality. In other words, at this later stage, 
there should be less variability in the prior beliefs of 
potential funders. By observing more Facebook 
activities in the later periods of crowdfunding, potential 
funders will likely be incentivized to follow others’ 
actions (either engage in Facebook activities and/or 
contribute to the project), resulting in a herding effect. 
Herd behavior describes individuals’ tendency to imitate 
the actions of others when making decisions (Banerjee, 
1992). Sun (2013) argues that one primary motivator for 
herd behavior is the observation of others’ actions. 
Individuals observing the actions of others may follow 
suit because such actions have been “proven right” by 
other people. This type of behavior is commonly 
observed in technology adoption (Duan, Gu, & 
Whinston, 2009; Sun, 2013), financial trading (Admati 
& Pfleiderer, 1988; Welch, 1992; Dow, 2004), and P2P 
lending (Herzenstein et al., 2011; Zhang and Liu, 2012). 
We therefore hypothesize that the impact of Facebook 
activities on crowdfunding outcomes in the closing 
period is also strong because of the herding effect.  
In the intermediate period, potential funders may be 
more likely to wait, observing the progress of the project 
and others’ reactions on social media. Hence, we 
hypothesize that the impact of Facebook activities is 
relatively weak in the intermediate period. In sum, we 
develop another three hypotheses to test the temporal 
effects of Facebook activities. 
H2a: In the opening period of crowdfunding, Facebook 
activities have a strong impact on crowdfunding 
outcomes. 
H2b: In the closing period of crowdfunding, Facebook 
activities have a strong impact on crowdfunding 
outcomes. 
H2c: In the intermediate period of crowdfunding, 
Facebook activities have a relatively weak 
impact on crowdfunding outcomes. 
Next, we examine the moderating effect with regard to 
two important aspects of crowdfunding projects: 
fundraising goals and project categories. Upon 
observing these two factors, potential funders form their 
first impressions of the project scope and their 
expectations for the product or service proposed by the 
project creator. Potential funders are likely to be drawn 
in to read on the details of the project or driven away 
from the project. Therefore, the impact of Facebook 
activities may differ in magnitude across different 
projects.  
First, in terms of fundraising goals, it has been shown 
and explained in previous studies that project size 
influences funders’ expectations and, consequently, 
their funding decisions (Mollick, 2014; Zheng et. al., 
2014). To be successful, projects with higher 
fundraising goals (hereafter called larger projects) 
require more attention and contribution from larger 
crowds than those with lower fundraising goals 
(hereafter called smaller projects). Smaller projects are 
generally considered to be less uncertain because their 
goals are more likely to be achieved and funders are thus 
more likely to be rewarded by the creator. Hence, we 
expect the impact of Facebook activities to be more 
pronounced for smaller projects than for larger projects.  
Second, in terms of project categories, projects in 
private-good categories (such as games, technology, and 
comics) “aim to produce output that is ultimately sold at 
a profit” (Hong et al., 2018). The funders of such 
projects expect to receive tangible rewards such as 
product prototypes. Their actions are motivated by their 
personal desires and needs, which potentially vary to a 
great extent, as does thus their uncertainty about the 
decision. Projects in public-good categories (such as art, 
music, film, and theater) “primarily benefit others” 
(Hong et al., 2018). The crowd contributes to such 
projects to support some common good cause, thus less 
variance is expected in individual actions. Therefore, we 
anticipate the impact of Facebook activities to be more 
pronounced for projects in public-good categories than 
in private-good categories. We thus propose our sixth 
hypothesis to test the moderating effects. 
H3: The impact of Facebook activities is more 
pronounced for projects with lower fundraising 
goals and projects in public-good categories. 
4 Data Collection and Summary 
Statistics 
We collected our data from both Kickstarter and 
Facebook in 2013. Kickstarter provides relevant data for 
both project characteristics and creator attributes. 
Project characteristics data capture the basic information 
of a project, such as fundraising goals, the category of 
the project, level of funds raised, and so forth. Creator 
attributes data contain observable personal 
characteristics of the creators, such as the number of 
Facebook friends and the number of other projects the 
creator has submitted in the past. We also fed project 
links into the Facebook API (application programming 
interface) to acquire online Facebook activities related 
to the project, such as the number of people who have 
“liked” the project, the number of people who have 
“shared” the project link, and the number of people who 
have made “comments” about the project. Table 2 
provides an overview of the variables’ definitions
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Table 2. Definitions of Variables  
Project characteristics 
Goal The level of funds to be raised, preset by the project creator 
Duration Funding period of the project, preset by the project creator 
Category The category the project is labeled 
Website = 1 if the creator sets up a website for this project, 0 otherwise 
Updates Number of times the creator has updated the project page 
Levels Number of pledge levels, preset by the project creator 
Min Lowest pledge level with reward 
GoalDaily Goal / duration 
Project outcome 
Success  = 1 if the project is successfully funded, 0 otherwise 
Pledged Amount of funds collected from funders 
Funders Number of people who fund the project 
LaunchingDate The date when the creator posts the project on Kickstarter 
FundedDate The first day the project is fully funded 
FundedDuration Number of days between the launching date and the funded date 
PercentageDuration FundedDuration / (duration + 1) 
Feedback Number of users’ feedback on the project page 
Creator attributes 
Backed Number of other people’s projects the creator has contributed 
Friends Number of friends the creator has on Facebook 
Facebook activity (all projects, up to the fundraising deadline) 
Total Number of total Facebook activities about the project 
Like Number of Facebook “likes” about the project 
Comment Number of Facebook “comments” about the project 
Share Number of Facebook “shares” of the project 
TotalDaily Daily number of total Facebook activities about the project 
LikeDaily Daily number of Facebook “likes” about the project 
CommentDaily Daily number of Facebook “comments” about the project 
ShareDaily Daily number of Facebook “shares” of the project 
Facebook activity (successful projects only, up to the funded date) 
Total2 Number of total Facebook activities about the project 
Like2 Number of Facebook “likes” about the project 
Comment2 Number of Facebook “comments” about the project 
Share2 Number of Facebook “shares” of the project 
TotalDaily2 Daily number of total Facebook activities about the project 
LikeDaily2 Daily number of Facebook “likes” about the project 
CommentDaily2 Daily number of Facebook “comments” about the project 
ShareDaily2 Daily number of Facebook “shares” of the project 
Temporal Effects of Facebook Likes on Crowdfunding  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Goal 7289 17960.43  100709.10  1.00  5000000.00  
Duration 7289 27.47  8.53  2.00  60.00  
GoalDaily 7289 644.16  3198.02  0.03  131579.00  
Website 7289 0.84  0.37  0.00  1.00  
Updates 7289 2.85  4.99  0.00  101.00  
Levels 7289 9.04  5.69  1.00  80.00  
Min 7289 8.26  20.01  1.00  599.00  
Success 7289 0.45  0.50  0.00  1.00  
Pledged 7289 8134.99  51107.92  0.00  2232933.00  
Funders 7289 107.14  491.83  0.00  22195.00  
FundedDuration 3262 17.33  11.02  0.00  60.00  
PercentageDuration 3262 0.65  0.34  0.00  1.00  
Feedback 7289 43.40  1533.91  0.00  123624.00  
Backed 7289 3.57  11.73  0.00  480.00  
Friends  7289 478.09  736.10  0.00  5076.00  
Total 7289 335.42  1099.67  0.00  34582.00  
Like 7289 177.92  593.65  0.00  18812.00  
Comment 7289 54.44  254.61  0.00  8288.00  
Share 7289 103.06  337.01  0.00  12767.00  
TotalDaily 7289 12.49  41.96  0.00  1824.50  
LikeDaily 7289 6.66  23.73  0.00  1100.00  
CommentDaily 7289 2.00  8.99  0.00  295.50  
ShareDaily 7289 3.83  12.04  0.00  429.00  
Total2 3262 447.45  1104.95  0.00  29095.00  
Like2 3262 245.28  620.09  0.00  14306.00  
Comment2 3262 67.39  226.90  0.00  7888.00  
Share2 3262 134.78  326.55  0.00  9848.00  
TotalDaily2 3262 16.49 36.74 0.00 969.83 
LikeDaily2 3262 9.03 20.73 0.00 461.48 
CommentDaily2 3262 2.48 7.61 0.00 262.93 
ShareDaily2 3262 4.97 10.79 0.00 328.27 
We constructed our sample as follows: (1) We 
compared the fundraising goal to the amount of funds 
collected from the funders by the fundraising deadline, 
so that we could determine whether the project was 
successful. (2) If the project was successful, we set the 
funded date as the first day the project was fully funded 
and calculated the funded duration as the time length 
between the launching date and funded date. (3) We 
also calculated the percentage duration of successfully 
funded projects, defined as the funded duration divided 
by one plus the fundraising duration. (4) We 
constructed two samples with Facebook activities: 
Sample A comprised all projects, we recorded each 
project’s cumulative number of Facebook activities at 
the fundraising deadline and then divided them by the 
fundraising duration to obtain the daily average 
number of Facebook activities; Sample B comprised 
successful projects only and we recorded their 
cumulative number of Facebook activities on the date 
funded and also calculated the daily average during the 
duration of funding. 
There was a total of 7,289 projects in our sample; 3,262 
were successful and 4,027 were unsuccessful. As 
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described before, we collected three sets of variables, 
reflecting projects’ characteristics, creators’ attributes, 
and Facebook activities, respectively. Table 3 presents 
summary statistics of the variables in our sample. 
We present the correlation matrix in Table 4. We note 
that the three Facebook activities (i.e., Variables 4-6) 
are highly correlated with each other. For example, the 
coefficient between the number of “likes” and number 
of “comments” is 0.846. A multicollinearity issue may 
arise when all three measures are included in the same 
regression. We thus carefully address the 
multicollinearity issue in the subsequent analysis. The 
Facebook activities also correlate with project 
characteristics and creator attributes; however, the 
correlations are moderate and small. Correlations 
among all the control variables (i.e., Variables 7-15) 
are also moderate and small. 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 A Logit Model 
We first employed the following simple logistic 
regression to test H1a: 
{
 
 Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 1|𝑿) =
exp(𝜷𝑿)
1 + exp(𝜷𝑿)
𝜷𝑿 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐵 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +
                 + 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀
 
The dependent variable 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 is a dummy that 
equals one if the project is successfully funded and 
zero otherwise. The independent variable 𝐹𝐵 measures 
the daily number of Facebook “likes,” “shares,” and 
“comments.” Since three measures are highly 
correlated, we further constructed an aggregate 
measure “total,” which is the sum of all three numbers, 
to indicate the collective online chatter of 
crowdfunding projects. We then added the time-fixed 
effect and category-fixed effect to the model to capture 
the unobserved constant heterogeneity across time and 
within each project category (Wooldridge, 2010). The 
time-effect dummy labels a project’s launching month, 
and the category-effect dummy labels a project’s 
category. We also applied both effects in our 
subsequent tests. The results of the regression are 
shown in Table 5. 
According to Model 1, the coefficient of the number of 
daily Facebook activities is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that they generate a positive 
impact on the crowdfunding outcome. Models 2 to 4 
present the individual effects of daily “likes,” daily 
“shares,” and daily “comments.” Our empirical results 
suggest that all three measures are significantly and 
positively related to the success likelihood, which is 
consistent with H1a. Moreover, they exhibit 
substantially different degrees of effects. Daily 
“comments” had the strongest effect, which may be 
due to the textual and sentiment-based information 
contained in the comments. This is more apparent in 
Model 5, in which we test all three measures 
simultaneously. Their coefficients are 0.039, 0.226, 
and 0.075, respectively, and are all significant. 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Success                
2. Pledged 0.655              
3. Total  0.312 0.319             
4. Like  0.303 0.303 0.968            
5. Comment  0.304 0.312 0.923 0.846           
6. Share  0.309 0.324 0.944 0.892 0.883          
7. LogGoal  -0.247 -0.286 0.316 0.3 0.298 0.32         
8. Duration  -0.096 -0.067 0.115 0.104 0.107 0.125 0.238        
9. Website  0.118 0.146 0.112 0.107 0.105 0.118 0.065 0.044       
10. Updates  0.344 0.383 0.421 0.388 0.42 0.451 0.179 0.147 0.146      
11. Levels  0.167 0.223 0.367 0.351 0.344 0.373 0.306 0.103 0.137 0.412     
12. Min  -0.052 -0.13 -0.053 -0.049 -0.05 -0.054 0.032 -0.027 -0.031 -0.075 -0.189    
13. Feedback  0.2 0.231 0.38 0.336 0.457 0.405 0.177 0.092 0.074 0.527 0.248 -0.021   
14. Backed  0.225 0.26 0.198 0.185 0.211 0.2 0.053 0.033 0.108 0.397 0.243 -0.068 0.292  
15. Friends  0.122 0.122 0.167 0.171 0.125 0.168 0.02 0.015 0.101 0.052 0.107 -0.014 -0.04 0.064 
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Table 5. A Logistic Regression  
 





































Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Category effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.136 0.141 0.136 0.149 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Since the three Facebook activities are highly 
correlated, as shown in Table 4, there could be 
multicollinearity issues in Model 5. To address this 
issue, we constructed three orthogonal Facebook 
variables that retained their effects in the model and 
had zero correlation with each other at the same time 
(Golub & Van Loan, 2012).5 We performed logistic 
regression and OLS regression with these three 
orthogonal variables and found that all three 
orthogonal Facebook activity measures still had 
significant and positive relationships with the outcome 
of the project. 
5.2 Adding Additional Control Variables  
We further added two sets of variables in the regression 
to control for project characteristics and creator 
attributes. The results are presented in Table 6. The 
additional two sets of variables exerted a significant 
influence on the likelihood of success, and our results 
are consistent with prior studies. For instance, 
Zvilichovsky et al. (2015) confirmed a positive 
reciprocity effect, which suggests that a creator’s past 
contributions to the crowdfunding community are 
positively related to the success likelihood of the 
creator’s project. Previous research has also identified a 
positive friends and family effect, suggesting that being 
a creator with a larger social network is positively 
related to a favorable outcome (Agrawal, Catalini, & 
Goldfarb, 2011; Mollick, 2014). We mark all the project 
characteristics and creator attributes as “Controls.” 
When necessary, we include the controls in the 
subsequent regressions. To focus our discussions on the 
impact of social media activities, we do not report the 
estimates of these controls. 
In their interviews with project creators and funders, 
Gerber, Hui, and Kuo (2012) found that one of the key 
motivations for funders is seeking rewards. Since 
Kickstarter is a reward-based crowdfunding platform, 
creators must design the “right” rewards to incentivize 
potential funders. As mentioned before, the creator 
generally sets a number of pledge levels, with each 
pledge level representing a monetary contribution and 
its corresponding reward. Setting more pledge levels 
allows potential funders to self-select their respective 
contribution level, which increases the probability of 
success. This positive relationship is captured by the 
coefficient of the variable Levels. In addition, the 
variable Min denotes the base (lowest) monetary 
requirement. One surprising finding is that the 
coefficient of Min is also positive. Since the average 
base pledge level was $8.26, as shown in Table 3, this 
finding suggests that project creators should be able to 
raise the minimum pledge by a few dollars without 
jeopardizing the crowdfunding outcome.  
 
5 We use the “orthog” procedure in Stata to construct the 
three orthogonal Facebook variables. 
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Table 6. Adding Additional Control Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables   
TotalDaily 0.076*** 
(8.953) 
































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Observations 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 
 
Pseudo R2 0.357 0.359 0.349 0.350 0.364 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Model 6 is the marginal effects of Model 5. 
Finally, all of the 𝐹𝐵 coefficients are positive and 
significant, both individually and collectively. Model 
6 presents the marginal effects of Model 5, which 
implies that an additional daily “like,” “comment,” or 
“share” is related to an increase of success likelihood 
of 0.11%, 0.2%, and 0.09%, respectively. 
Interestingly, we find that the effect of daily “likes” 
becomes stronger than the effect of daily “shares,” and 
that the gap between the effect of daily “likes” and that 
of daily “comments” is smaller than that documented 
in Table 5. In our preceding analyses, we employed 
only the success likelihood as the dependent variable 
to reflect Kickstarter’s “all-or-nothing” policy, which 
allows the project creator to collect the funds given 
only if the project is fully funded by the deadline. 
Otherwise, the creator collects nothing, even if the 
project has reached 99% of its fundraising goal.  
To test H1b, we created the percentage of funds 
pledged with respect to the fundraising goal as the 
dependent variable, which is represented by log (1 +
𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙
). A log transformation was necessary since the 
percentage values vary from 0 to 665. The resulting 
relationship between the percentage of pledged funds 
and the Facebook activities is still positive and 
significant as indicated in Table 7. H1b is thus 
supported. 
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Table 7. Facebook Activities and Percentage of Pledged Funds 
 



































Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Category effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.453 0.454 0.453 0.457 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table 8. Moderating Effects 










LikeDaily*PublicCategory  0.055** 
(2.008) 
Project characteristics Yes Yes 
Creator characteristics  Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes 
SubCategory effect Yes Yes 
 
Observations 7,289 4,852 
Pseudo R2 0.407 0.322 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
5.3 Moderating Effects  
As discussed in Section 3, we hypothesize that the 
impact of Facebook activities is more pronounced for 
projects with lower fundraising goals and projects in 
the public-good categories (H3). We now empirically 
examine the hypothesis by testing the interaction terms 
with regard to the fundraising goals and the project 
categories. We present our results in Table 8. 
Model 1 reports the results according to fundraising 
goals—i.e., large projects vs. small projects. After 
controlling the daily “like” effect, the coefficient of the 
interaction term (i.e., LikeDaily*DailyGoal) is 
negative and significant, which suggests that the 
impact of Facebook “likes” is more pronounced for 
small crowdfunding projects. Model 2 reports the 
results according to project categories—public-good 
vs. private-good projects. Our results show that the 
projects in the public-good categories achieve a higher 
aggregate coefficient, which suggests that the impact 
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of Facebook “likes” is more pronounced for projects in 
the public-good categories. Both results support H3 
and provide insights into the cross-section variations 
among different crowdfunding projects on the 
Kickstarter platform. 
5.4 Controlling for Endogeneity  
In the current context, the most critical endogeneity 
concerns are reverse causality and omitted variables. 
The most common way to address these issues in a 
cross-sectional framework is to apply the two-stage 
least square (2SLS) regression (Heckman, 1979; 
Mayhew and Mihov, 2004). In the first stage, an OLS 
regression is performed on the endogenous variables 
using an instrumental variable (IV) and a set of 
exogenous variables; in the second stage, the predicted 
values from the first stage are then used to replace the 
actual values of the endogenous variables, so that an 
OLS model for the response of interest can be 
computed. The challenge is to identify an appropriate 
IV, since a weak IV could lead to a result even more 
biased than results without any IV at all.  
Lewbel (2012) argues that testing endogeneity is 
equivalent to testing the triangularity of a simultaneous 
equation system. Specifically, in our study, consider 
the simultaneous equation systems: 
{
𝑃𝑃𝐹 = 𝛾1𝐹𝐵 + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜖1
𝐹𝐵 = 𝛾2𝑃𝑃𝐹 + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜖2
. 
Again, 𝐹𝐵 measures the daily number of Facebook 
“likes,” “shares,” and “comments.” 𝑃𝑃𝐹 is the 
percentage of pledged funds, 𝑋 represents the control 
variables, and 𝜖 = (𝜖1, 𝜖2) is the unobserved error. The 
system is fully simultaneous (endogenous) if 𝛾2 ≠ 0, 
otherwise the system is well identified (triangular). 
Lewbel (2012) proposes a new class of generated 
instruments—heteroskedasticity-based instruments— 
to achieve the identification in the simultaneous 
equation systems. These instruments are constructed 
by the model’s data and serve to identify structural 
parameters in regressions with the endogenous or 
mismeasured regressors. The assumptions in Lewbel 
(2012) are very general and mild for the constructed 
instruments and the simultaneous equation systems. 
The identification scheme requires the additivity of the 
endogenous regressors and is based on their higher 
moments, which are likely to be noisy. We construct 
the generated instruments using the auxiliary 
equations’ residuals, multiplied by each of the included 
exogenous variables in mean-centered form: 
𝑍𝑗 = (𝑋𝑗 − ?̅?)𝜖, 
where 𝜖 is the vector of residuals from the “first stage 
regression.” The generated instruments 𝑍𝑗 fulfill the 
identification requirements, cov(𝑍𝑗 , 𝜖1𝜖2) = 0 and 
cov(𝑋, 𝜖𝑖
2) ≠ 0, where 𝑖 = 1, 2. For more details, 
please see Lewbel (2012). 
After obtaining the generated instrument variables 
(IVs), we further applied the second stage to test 
endogeneity, and we present these results in Table 9. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦̂ , 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦̂ , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦̂ , and 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦̂  denote the fitted natural logarithm of the 
number of daily Facebook activities during the 
fundraising period. The results demonstrate that all the 
coefficients are positive at the 1% significance level. 
In addition, the generated IVs passed several 
identification tests, indicating that the IVs are valid and 
appropriate. Therefore, our earlier results do not 
appear to be driven by reversal causality or omitted 
variables. 
Table 10 presents the model fit indices. Row 1 
provides the AIC and BIC from the logistic regression 
without any Facebook activities. Rows 2 to 6 provide 
the AICs and BICs from the logistic regressions with 
Facebook activities individually and together. 
Including the Facebook activities in the regression 
largely improved the models. For example, including 
the “like” measure alone reduced the AIC by 9.82% 
and BIC by 9.12%. As lower AIC and BIC indicate a 
better model, our Facebook activity measures largely 
improved the model of success likelihood. 
5.5 A Panel Data Approach 
To showcase the changes in Facebook activities over 
the fundraising period, we chose crowdfunding 
projects that lasted 30 days, which is about the sample 
mean. The evolution of the number of “likes” is 
illustrated in Figure 2. We found that the number of 
“likes” increased over time but more rapidly in the 
opening period of crowdfunding. The successful 
projects (i.e., dashed line) form an S-curve. Put 
differently, in our study, successful projects generated 
significant social momentum early on, maintained a 
slightly lower speed during the main portion of the 
fundraising period, and then accelerated again toward 
the end. While the failed projects also received 
increments of “likes” at the beginning of the fundraising 
period, the momentum of these “likes” quickly slowed 
down. Thus, the differences between successful and 
unsuccessful projects lie not only in the volume of social 
conversations but also in their speed. We constructed a 
panel that includes the time-series data of Facebook 
activities throughout the fundraising period for each 
project. We also created three additional variables: (1) 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡: project 𝑖’s cumulative funds pledged on 
day 𝑡 divided by the project’s goal; (2) 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡: project 𝑖’s 
cumulative Facebook activities counts on day 𝑡; and (3) 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡: a dummy that indicates whether the project 
is successfully funded or not on day 𝑡. 
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Table 9. Controlling for Endogeneity: IV Regression 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦̂  0.003*** 
(8.741) 























Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Category effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 7,289 7,289 7,289 7,289 
R2 0.345 0.343 0.342 0.343 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Table 10. Model Fit 





1 w/o IVs 7275.452 7758.04   
2 w/ Total 6577.012 7066.495 9.60% 8.91% 
3 w/ likes 6561.233 7050.716 9.82% 9.12% 
4 w/ comments 6647.622 7137.104 8.63% 8.00% 
5 w/ shares 6653.092 7142.575 8.55% 7.93% 
6 w/ likes & comments & shares 6508.863 7012.134 10.54% 9.61% 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of Number of “Likes” over a 30-Day Fundraising Period 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1205 







Time effect Yes 
Category effect Yes  
Observations 193,042 





Between R2 0.0063 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
5.5.1 Random effect panel regression 
We applied the following regression model to the panel: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 +
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. 
The key explanatory variables are the lagged Facebook 
activities. Since “likes,” “shares,” “comments,” and 
“total activities” all show a similar effect, we only 
present the panel regression with “likes” in this 
subsection.6 Control variables include the 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 
dummy and additional variables related to project 
characteristics and creator attributes. We note that 
some variables are constant throughout time, while 
others (e.g., success, updates, feedbacks, and friends) 
may be time-variant. Table 11 presents the regression 
results. The pooled panel data regression shows that 
our previous results are robust and that Facebook 
activities have a persistent, positive impact on 
crowdfunding outcomes. 
5.5.2 Fixed Effect Panel Regression 
Another major concern is that crowdfunding outcomes 
may be largely driven by the quality of the project 
rather than the Facebook activities. Although 
measuring quality comprehensively remains extremely 
difficult, we note that the quality of a project is 
generally determined before a crowdfunding project 
even starts. Major revisions seldom occur, given the 
brevity of the fundraising period. Therefore, we 
assume that the project quality is constant over the 
period and we tackled this issue with our fixed-effect 
panel regression, in which the constant project-level 
 
6 Note that we also conducted separate tests on “shares” and 
“comments,” and the results are similar. 
characteristics are canceled out. However, this means 
that we can no longer estimate their coefficients. Table 
12 presents the regression results from our fixed effect 
panel regression. The results show that the coefficient 
of “likes” is still positive and significant, which 
indicates that Facebook “likes” do contribute to 
crowdfunding outcomes. However, we cannot claim a 
causal relationship if there are still unobservable time-
varying variables that affect both the increments of the 
number of “likes” and the crowdfunding outcome. 
5.5.3 Duration Model  
To test H2, we applied a time-to-event analysis to 
examine the dynamic movement of Facebook activities 
and crowdfunding outcomes. The duration model (or 
hazard model, see, Van den Berg and Gerard, 2001) 
takes into account not only whether a crowdfunding 
project is successfully funded but also when the project 
is successfully funded, as the latter point cannot be 
determined by the logit model. Specifically, we use the 
Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) since there 
are fewer parametric restrictions on this model. The 
benefit of the Cox model is that it can fit the survival 
models without specifying the distribution—which 
may be log-normal, Weibull, or any other parametric 
distribution. One may also use the likelihood function 
to estimate the parameters in the survival analysis if the 
exact distribution is known. In our analysis, we focus 
on the hazard function (which is similar to the 
conditional probability of success) with time-varying 
covariates. The model to be estimated takes the 
following form: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) = ℎ0(𝑡) ∙ exp(𝑋(𝑡)𝛽
′), 
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where ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) is the hazard rate at time 𝑡 for a 
crowdfunding project with covariates 𝑋(𝑡) that include 
the number of “likes,” fundraising goal (in log form), 
and additional control variables. Based on the above 
equation, we were able to implement the duration 
model to study the time-dependent covariates with 
censoring in the data (Meyer, 1990). For any project 
(successful or not), the time variable is defined as the 
ratio of elapsed time length at current time 𝑖 to the 
preset fundraising duration. The variable measures the 
percentage of time already elapsed. Since the variable 
of interest are time variant, this model examines the 
effect of differences between projects, as well as 
changes over time. It helps us understand the effects of 
“like” clicks in different periods of crowdfunding. 
ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function and the Cox 
proportional hazard model does not impose any 
restrictions on ℎ0(𝑡). The Cox regression estimates 
coefficient 𝛽 using the maximum likelihood method 
without estimating ℎ0(𝑡). A positive coefficient 
implies that a higher 𝑋 is linked to a higher hazard rate 
and thus a lower expected duration. exp(𝛽) is the 
hazard ratio, which measures the extent to which the 
hazard of the project’s success increases if the 
independent variable is changed by one unit. We report 
the results in Table 13. 
Column 1 of Table 13 reports the estimates of 
coefficients from the Cox proportional hazard model 
and Column 2 reports the hazard ratios. We found the 
lagged number of “likes” to be significantly and 
positively related to the hazard ratio of a successful 
crowdfunding outcome. A hazard ratio above 2 means 
that during the same time period, if the LogLike_t-1 
(log lagged “likes”) increases by 1 unit, then the 
probability of the project being successful more than 
doubles. 







Time effect Yes 
Category effect Yes  
Observations 193,042 
Number of projects 7,289 
R2 0.011 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p<0.05, *p < 0.1  
Table 13. Cox Proportional Hazard Model 










Controls Yes  
Time effect Yes  
Category effect Yes  
 
Likelihood ratio test -24961.2  
No. of successes 4024  
No. of failures 3159  
Observations 159613  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 




Figure 3. Hazard Ratios of High vs. Low Volumes of Lagged “Likes” 
Table 14. Robustness Check 














Project characteristics Yes  
Creator characteristics Yes  
Time effect Yes  
SubCategory effect Yes  
 
Observations 7,289  
Pseudo R2 
Note: Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Figure 3 illustrates the economic significance of 
Facebook activity from our duration model analysis. 
All the covariates are held at their sample means except 
for the number of lagged “likes” (in log form), which 
is differentiated at the tenth (the dashed line in the 
figure) and ninetieth percentiles (the solid line in the 
figure), respectively. The hazard ratios are close to 
zero at all times when the volume of lagged “likes” is 
very low. When the volume is in the upper region, the 
hazard ratios are significantly positive. The substantial 
difference in the hazard functions demonstrates that 
Facebook “likes” significantly and positively influence 
successful crowdfunding projects. Interestingly, the 
temporal effects of Facebook “likes” are neither linear 
nor constant. Rather, we observe a J-curve hazard 
function, which suggests that the impact of Facebook 
“likes” is more notable in the opening and closing 
periods of crowdfunding. In addition, there is a 
considerable surge as the crowdfunding process comes 
close to the end. The findings are consistent with H2. 
In particular, Facebook activities primarily help signal 
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crowdfunding, i.e., the quality-signaling effect; in the 
closing period of crowdfunding, Facebook activities 
have a herding effect that attracts a surge of traffic to 
the projects and improves their probability of success. 
More importantly, our empirical results also reveal that 
the herding effect in the closing period is even stronger 
than the quality-signaling effect in the opening period, 
an intriguing finding that cannot be easily verified or 
predicted by the theory. 
This J-curve finding suggests to the project creators 
that there could be two deceptive periods during the 
crowdfunding process even if there is good momentum 
on Facebook. The first period occurs at the very 
beginning of crowdfunding, when the seemingly quick 
inflow of funding appears to indicate the quality of the 
project. The second one happens after some time, when 
the speed of the funding influx drops gradually and 
persistently. At this point, it seems like the project is 
going to fail after all, which may be viewed as a big 
disappointment that may discourage the project creator 
from continuing social marketing efforts. However, 
our results indicate that project creators should 
continue their efforts in such a situation—as long as 
the corresponding cumulative social media activities 
have been persistently increasing, there is a good 
chance of success in the final fundraising period based 
on a strong herding effect. 
5.5.4 Robustness Check 
To check the robustness of the temporal effects, we 
decomposed the total number of daily “likes” into three 
timespans over the fundraising duration and 
reexamined the impact of Facebook “likes.” Table 14 
reports our empirical results. Model 1 presents the 
coefficients of variables from the logit regression on 
crowdfunding success, and Model 2 describes the 
marginal effects of these variables. LikeDaily_Beg is 
the total number of daily “likes” in the first quarter of 
crowdfunding, LikeDaily_Int is the total number of 
“likes” from the second to the third quarter, and 
LikeDaily_End is the total number of “likes” in the 
fourth (also the last) quarter. Control variables, time 
effect, and subcategory effect are the same as those in 
Table 6. Both the coefficients in Column 1 and the 
marginal effects in Column 2 support our J-curve 
finding. The impact of Facebook “likes” on the 
likelihood of crowdfunding success is stronger in both 
the opening and closing periods of fundraising, 
whereas the impact is much weaker in the intermediate 
period. Comparing the opening and closing periods, 
Facebook “likes” have a higher impact in the closing 
period. 
 
6 Conclusions and Implications 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
Small and medium-sized businesses as well as 
individuals are increasingly using online 
crowdfunding platforms to raise funds in the fintech 
world. Creators of crowdfunding projects depend 
heavily on social networks such as Facebook to 
publicize their projects in order to locate sufficient 
numbers of potential funders and meet their 
fundraising goals. Such exposure is made possible 
primarily by social buttons such as the Facebook “like” 
button. The sheer size of “likes” may be highly 
impactful if they accumulate the right momentum. Not 
surprisingly, crowdfunding has triggered a new type of 
business that packages and sells Facebook “likes” and 
similar social media activities. However, some studies 
suggest that these activities may fail to generate much 
value for a business. To fully explore this issue, our 
study examines the significance of the impact of social 
media activities and, more importantly, investigate the 
temporal effects of the impact of social media activities 
in the context of reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms.  
Our research quantitatively confirms that social media 
activities are significantly related to crowdfunding 
outcomes. The resulting impact may be immediate and 
very effective in the online world due to tremendous 
progress in transparency. Furthermore, our duration 
model analysis reveals that the impact of social media 
activities on crowdfunding outcomes follows a J-curve 
in the temporal space, a key contribution that 
distinguishes our study from prior literature. We offer 
an explanation of the J-curve by identifying two 
important effects of social media activities throughout 
the crowdfunding process: a quality-signaling effect in 
the opening period and a herding effect in the closing 
period. Especially in the “last mile” of crowdfunding, 
there is a strong herding effect that generates a 
persistent acceleration that helps crowdfunding 
projects reach their respective fundraising goals. 
Accordingly, the implications for project creators 
differ in different crowdfunding periods. Lastly, we 
examine the moderating effects with regard to two 
important aspects of crowdfunding projects, that is, 
fundraising goals and project categories. We show that 
the impact of social media activities is more 
pronounced for small crowdfunding projects and 
projects in public-good categories. 
Despite our best efforts to address endogeneity issues 
and control for necessary variables in our dataset, there 
is plausible room for improvement. For instance, 
project quality is a great indicator that can be used to 
measure crowdfunding outcomes; however, we were 
not able to quantify quality scores, given the complex 
nature of crowdfunding projects. Moreover, 
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influencers (e.g., celebrities) likely strongly impact 
certain crowdfunding projects. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to tease out that assumption. Furthermore, we 
were unable to determine whether a project had also 
been promoted outside of Kickstarter. Finally, because 
this paper focuses specifically on crowdfunding, which 
requires a crowd and a short fundraising cycle, our 
results may not be applicable to other fields. 
6.2 Implications for the Project Creators 
The J-curve we identified suggests that the impact of 
social media activities is relatively strong at the 
beginning of a crowdfunding effort because of a 
quality-signaling effect. Thus, obtaining a good 
starting momentum would send a positive quality 
signal to potential funders. Specifically, we have the 
following suggestions to project creators in the early 
period. First, we recommend recruiting friends and 
family to spread the word on social media sites such as 
Facebook. Since it is challenging to generate the 
desired level of social media activity shortly after a 
project is posted, getting help and support from close 
contacts can be an effective way to make it through the 
early period of crowdfunding. Friends and family 
could help by sharing the project on Facebook and 
recommending the project to their own friends. 
Second, we suggest that project creators provide 
incentives for users to “share” and “like” the project. 
As Kickstarter is a reward-based crowdfunding 
platform, project creators could design substantial 
rewards for early initiators. For instance, creators 
could offer substantial discounts on future product 
consumption to the first 100 users who “share” and 
“like” the project on Facebook. Third, we recommend 
creating a fan page on Facebook. A fan page not only 
helps create a fan base community, but also 
consolidates resources and information. Having an 
official presence on Facebook can be useful for 
identifying potential funders, releasing project-related 
updates, engaging with online users, exploring 
opportunities to promote the project, and, most 
importantly, driving social media traffic. 
During the crowdfunding process, the impact of social 
media activities gradually weakens. A possible 
explanation is that people are uncertain about the 
project’s outcome so they wait to see whether the 
support for the project increases. During this period, 
people are less impacted by “shares” and “likes”; 
hence, we suggest that the creators make greater efforts 
to collect feedback from users, enhance project design, 
and update the existing funders with the latest project 
news. 
In the final period of crowdfunding, the aggregate 
social media activities become substantially stronger, 
indicating that people are significantly impacted by 
others through the herding effect. At this point, we 
would make the somewhat surprising recommendation 
that project creators should consider purchasing 
Facebook “likes” from “like” sellers such as the ones 
mentioned in the Introduction. Based on our empirical 
results, this unexpected recommendation may be an 
effective means to achieve fundraising goals in later 
periods. Purchasing “likes” would rapidly expand the 
number of “likes” at relatively low cost. In addition, 
the paid “likes” (generated by computer programs) are 
not differentiable from the unpaid “likes” (the actual 
“likes” clicked by a person) from the online users’ 
point of view. Nevertheless, we also clarify that the 
recommendation of purchasing “likes” is only made in 
the context of reward-based crowdfunding from a very 
practical perspective. The discussion of ethical and 
legal issues is outside the scope of this paper. 
6.3 Implication for Crowdfunding 
Platforms such as Kickstarter 
The results of this study also have implications for the 
design of crowdfunding platforms. Since the main 
source of revenue for crowdfunding platforms is 
commission fees charged to successfully funded 
projects, the platform has every incentive to assist the 
project creators in achieving their fundraising goals. 
One type of such assistance concerns the design of the 
platform’s project page. For example, platform 
developers could enable better use of the social buttons 
so that the creators could achieve the desired level of 
social media impact. We make the following concrete 
recommendations to platform developers concerning 
the design factors of crowdfunding platforms. 
First, we suggest that platform developers embed 
social buttons such as Facebook “likes” and “shares” 
in the source code of each project page so that they are 
visible and clickable on the page. Facebook provides a 
straightforward way for developers to configure the 
buttons on webpages. Second, optimal placement of 
the social buttons would attract more clicks. We 
suggest that platform developers place the social 
buttons on the project page in a way that is readily 
noticeable to users—for example, next to project titles. 
Generally speaking, “sharing” and “commenting” 
require the user’s input of written comments, which 
may hinder the user’s willingness to click the social 
buttons. Hence, we suggest that developers create a list 
of default comments that the user could choose from 
and easily use. For instance, “I find this Kickstarter 
project very innovative” and “Check out my favorite 
project on Kickstarter.” Furthermore, platforms should 
explicitly illustrate the strength of the social media 
impact. For example, by displaying the number of 
social button clicks on the project page. Such numbers 
offer users good signals of quality and social media 
impact. In addition, we suggest that platforms allow 
users to rank projects according to number of social 
button clicks. 
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